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Philosophers express angst about the existence of God, the immortality of the soul1, 
freedom of the will, the nature of mind 2 , the metaphysics of modality 3 , and other 
subjects. On such issues, some of us do not only try to figure out what is true, we worry 
about it. Consider the case of theism. Positions range anywhere from the view that life is 
meaningless without God, to the view that it is terrible with God, with plenty of room 
between those extremes. 4  Less attention has been devoted to similar questions in 
metaethics. Yet, just as someone might not only wonder, but worry about whether theism 
is true—so they might not just wonder, but worry about whether a particular metaethical 
theory is true. Given the immense importance of morality, it seems to me that there is 
much to explore in this area. This essay, I hope, begins to give angsty metaethics the 
attention that it deserves.5 
After sketching a general account of philosophical angst, I describe and defend a 
particular instance of it: angst regarding moral realism. Following the convention in the 
1 Eli Hirsch (2009, 2, 20) says that death and radical deception are “ineffably horrible” and “undermine 
everything that I have ever cared about in my life.” 
2 Jerry Fodor (1989, 77) says that “if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my 
reaching, and my itching is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible 
for my saying…. If none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything is false 
and it’s the end of the world.” 
3 Robert Adams (1979) argues that modal realism justifies “moral indifference.” 
4 See the essays recently published in Klaas Kraay (2018). 
5 See also Guy Kahane (2012)’s pioneering work on what he calls the “value question in metaphysics.” 
Although Kahane is more narrowly interested in evaluative judgments rather than full-fledged 
philosophical angst, this paper could be read partly as a metaethical contribution to the general research 
program advanced by Kahane. 
Final draft—please cite final version in Oxford Studies in Metaethics, volume 15.
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literature on the value of God’s existence, in which “pro-theist” is used to refer to 
someone who thinks that it is good that God exists (whether or not they believe that God 
actually exists), I will use “pro-realist” to refer to someone who hopes that moral realism 
is true and worries that it might not be (whether or not they believe that realism is true). 
According to pro-realists, the truth of realism is extremely important for some further 
good, and there are no adequate alternatives: it is realism or bust. The phenomenon of 
pro-realism is immediately recognizable, but it is less obvious how one might understand 
and defend it. As long as moral nihilism is false, how could something of great normative 
significance hinge on which non-nihilistic metaethic is true? There are many non-realist 
metaethical theories that, by their own lights, vindicate the moral domain—so how could 
it be bad if one of those theories turned out to be true? This essay seeks to make angst 
about moral realism intelligible and to commend one way that pro-realists can make their 
case to the angst-free. That being said, I do not pretend to have exhausted the 
considerations that might motivate (or defeat) philosophical angst about moral realism. 
§1 Philosophical Angst 
 Perhaps we know philosophical angst when we see it, but it is useful to have a 
more exact account in order to isolate the angst-inducing features of any particular 
domain. Here is how I understand the phenomenon: Philosophical angst is a complex 
cognitive judgment combined with a conative component. The cognitive judgment is that 
something existentially important is also irreplaceable. Existential importance is positive 
importance to the fundamental meaning, intelligibility, or overall value of our lives and 
the world. If you think that a claim might be false but do not think that its truth is 
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important in this sense, then you do not count as angsty. Irreplaceability means that there 
is no available surrogate for whatever plays the important role in question. If you think 
that an existentially important claim might be false but you also think that some 
alternative claim would do just as well, then you do not count as angsty. The conative 
component, licensed by the judgment, is a kind of anxiety that what is important and 
irreplaceable in this sense is or might be unavailable. Notice that, to be philosophically 
angsty, one need not believe the claim that one is angsty about, but both the claim and 
its falsity must at least be live options.6 
It should be no surprise that the most typical catalysts for philosophical angst are 
subjects including God, freedom, and death, rather than, say, the ontology of numbers or 
the semantics of counterfactuals. The former but not the latter subjects are especially 
significant in how we think about the meaning of our lives. But this explanation in terms 
of existential significance makes it at least somewhat surprising that metaethics is not 
subject to more angsty reflection than it is. After all, metaethics concerns the 
metaphysics, epistemology, semantics, and psychology of arguably the most important 
domain of value that there is—and minimally, a very important one. As a candidate for 
philosophical angst, metaethics seems intuitively closer to the philosophy of religion than 
to the ontology of numbers. 
The metaethicist who most readily comes to mind as angsty is probably Derek 
Parfit. In On What Matters, Parfit famously (to some, notoriously) declares that, if 
	
6 For a full account of philosophical angst, see my “Philosophical Angst” (ms). 
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metaethical non-naturalism is false, then nothing matters.7 This declaration satisfies the 
cognitive conditions for philosophical angst, provided that it includes or presupposes the 
thought that it is existentially important that something matters, and that no rival theory 
secures an adequate replacement for non-naturalist mattering. But Parfit’s angst is 
narrower than it appears at first glance. He thinks that views rival to his collapse into 
nihilism or something very close to nihilism. And Parfit does not offer a substantive 
proposal for why things matter only on his metaethical view; rather, their mattering only 
on his view is an immediate logical or conceptual consequence of the ways that he has 
(somewhat idiosyncratically) defined the relevant terminology and concepts, as several 
commentators have pointed out.8 Because he thinks that his rivals’ views collapse into 
nihilism, Parfit’s angst really amounts to the worry that nothing matters if nihilism is 
true—a claim much less controversial than it seemed prior to clarification. Moreover, it is 
not even clear that Parfit thinks it would be a bad thing if nihilism were true. Indeed, in 
volume 3 of On What Matters, he distances himself from the claim that it matters whether 
something matters.9 
These limitations of Parfit’s angst provide a good foil for illustrating some of the 
central concerns of this essay. In contrast to Parfit, we might be angsty about metaethics 
not because we think that most views collapse into nihilism. We might instead worry that, 
	
7 “If there were no such facts [facts that only “irreducibly normative claims” could state], and we didn’t 
need to make such claims, Sidgwick, Ross, I, and others would have wasted much of our lives. We have 
asked what matters, which acts are right or wrong, and what we have reasons to want, and to do. If 
Naturalism were true, there would be no point in trying to answer such questions. Our consolation would 
be only that it wouldn’t matter that we had wasted much of our lives, since we would have learnt that 
nothing matters” (Parfit 2011, 367). 
8 See Street (2017), Temkin (2017), and Driver (2017). 
9 See n. 15. 
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despite the fact that many views do not collapse into nihilism, they nevertheless fail to 
accommodate something irreplaceably important to the meaning or intelligibility of our 
lives. This latter kind of angst permits more philosophical charity, because it evaluates 
theories on their own terms, allowing that they basically accomplish what they purport 
to. In this essay, I am wondering about metaethical angst in this richer, more charitable 
sense. While I will discuss realism’s relationship to moral nihilism in its own right, I will 
not only discuss that; I am also interested in how realism compares to its non-nihilistic 
rivals—even when they succeed by their own lights. Compare: in thinking about freedom 
of the will, someone might be angsty if, in their view, only libertarianism about freedom 
secures something (in particular, libertarian freedom) that is both existentially important 
and irreplaceable. But this is substantively different from thinking that only libertarianism 
secures freedom in any sense. Someone (even a libertarian) may grant that compatibilist 
theories genuinely secure freedom of the will, but nevertheless still insist that such 
theories do not secure something extremely valuable or existentially important about the 
nature of freedom of the will, as it is described by libertarianism. 
In short, angst about moral realism, or pro-realism, is the view that the truth of 
moral realism is necessary for something irreplaceable and existentially important to our 
lives going well, combined with the worry that realism might be false. This does not mean, 
however, that the pro-realist must think that all alternative theories collapse into moral 
nihilism. 
§2 How to be angsty about moral realism 
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In this paper, I am chiefly concerned with moral realism in a fairly ambitious sense, 
though it is a research project in its own right to figure out which among realist options 
best satisfies certain existential concerns. According to moral realism in this sense, there 
are objective moral facts, and these can serve as the content of true beliefs in the same 
way that characteristically descriptive non-moral facts may do so (for example, the facts 
that human beings evolved or that two and two make four). We are able to know and 
express moral reality in propositional form, and we have, by-and-large, made genuine 
progress in moral inquiry. The moral facts are both necessary and radically response- or 
stance-independent, in that they are not fundamentally grounded in human minds or 
attitudes, whether individual, collective, actual, ideal, or otherwise hypothetical. This sort 
of picture, though loosely sketched, should be reminiscent of Enoch’s (2016) “robust” 
realism, Eklund’s (2017) “ardent” realism, and similar metaethical options.10 Eklund, for 
instance, identifies ardent realism as the view that “reality itself favors certain ways of 
valuing and acting” and says that the ardent realist “wants reality to undergird some ways 
of valuing over others,” such that there is even reason to favor a unique concept of “good” 
over alternatives. 11  I agree with Eklund’s sense that “ardent realist intuitions and 
motivations are widely shared,” even if not everyone calls themselves by the name. Pro-
realism says that something about this picture irreplaceably plays an existentially 
important role in the meaning or intelligibility of our lives, and so the fact that realism 
	
10 Notice that I have said nothing about the naturalism/non-naturalism distinction, even though my flavor 
of moral realism is often associated with the latter. I am unbothered if my characterization of realism 
entails or otherwise requires non-naturalism, but I am also not committed to its doing so.   
11 Eklund (2017, 1, 5). 
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might be false warrants anxiety. 12 It is not possible here to canvass all instances of non-
realism in their dizzying variety, so in what follows I will highlight three general contrasts: 
the contrast between realism and moral nihilism, between realism and anti-realism, and, 
finally, between realism and quasi-realism. 
The reasons for judging that it would be bad if moral nihilism were true are distinct 
from the reasons for judging that it would be bad if any form of non-realism (including 
both anti- and quasi-realism) were true. Unlike moral nihilism, anti- and quasi-realist 
theories are what I will call vindicatory metaethics, in the sense that they (by their own 
lights) justify moral discourse and practice. In short, they are not self-conceived as error 
theories. The pro-realist, however, is not only hopeful that morality be given a vindicatory 
account, à la non-nihilism (a hope that anti- and quasi-realists may also satisfy), but that 
it be given a distinctly realistic account. It is not just morality per se that the pro-realist 
thinks enjoys existentially important irreplaceability, but morality realistically construed. 
§2.1 The badness of moral nihilism 
Consider a simple example of an unmitigated injustice. In the History of the 
Peloponnesian War, Thucydides gives us an exchange between some Athenian invaders 
and their victims, the Melians. The Melians have no chance of resisting conquest. In 
	
12 Here it is worth noting that, in a continental context, my account of why the falsity of moral realism 
rightly induces philosophical angst is closest to the account of angst (or anxiety, or dread) one finds in 
Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness and “Existentialism is a Humanism.” Sartre locates the origin of 
anxiety in the fact that human beings are radically responsible not only for their own actions but for the 
very principles that guide them—in the sense that there is no objective, independent moral reality that 
determines this in advance. Of course, Sartre did not have in mind contemporary metaethical categories 
and one cannot know whether he would have also rejected anti-realism, but my account of the angst 
induced by non-realism is recognizably closer to his sense of angst than it is to, say, the systems of Soren 
Kierkegaard or Martin Heidegger, who have quite different concerns when they speak of angst. 
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emphasizing the pointlessness of resistance, the Athenians accurately observe that “the 
strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”13 What does this have to 
do with metaethics? If moral nihilism is true—that is, if morality is bunk—then there is no 
moral problem with the aforementioned relationship between the strong and the weak. 
The dominance of the strong over the weak may be painful and even regrettable, but it 
would not be morally unjustified or otherwise morally objectionable. This is a good 
ground for angst about the prospect of moral nihilism, because it seems bad that there 
would be no grounds for objecting morally to this pitiful state of affairs. Not morally bad, 
of course—after all, nothing morally substantive follows from the truth of moral 
nihilism—but bad in some kind of non-moral sense; our lives (or, at least, the lives of the 
weak) are worse off if they lack grounds for moral objection. Accordingly, it seems 
appropriate to hope that morality is not bunk. 
This simple argument is intuitive, but is the hope really reasonable? In what non-
moral sense is it “bad” to lack moral justification? As mentioned, it cannot be that moral 
nihilism results in some morally bad situation, since nihilism results in no morally valenced 
situations at all. Moreover, morality does not itself prevent the strong from doing what 
they can or the weak from suffering what they must; morality does not change the world. 
If morality does not change the world, then it is hard to see how nihilism would be bad 
even in a prudential or instrumental sense. What non-moral good does it do us that we 
can legitimately morally object to something, especially if it is just going to happen 
anyway? 
	
13 Thucydides (1996, 5.89, 416). 
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Nowadays it is common to distinguish between multiple domains of value, 
including but not limited to morality, meaning, aesthetics, and self-interest. Careful 
attention to these distinctions and their interaction in deliberation is, in my view, one of 
the significant accomplishments of 20th century normative theory. One’s life might be 
good along some of these dimensions but not others. A predominantly self-interested 
person might live a life abounding in prudential value (say, they always get what they 
want) but sorely lacking in moral value. Likewise, the “moral saint” might live a life 
abounding in moral value but sorely lacking in meaning.14 The acknowledgement that 
moral value does not exhaust the values that we should (and do) care about is an 
important advancement beyond a myopic focus on moral value.  
But if philosophers of the past too often ignored the role that non-moral value 
plays in a good life, it is also important to see that moral value may contribute to, or even 
be required for, the fulfillment of the other kinds of value. It is true that a person’s life 
may be abounding in moral worth yet lacking in meaning, but it is also true that a life 
entirely lacking in moral worth may—precisely in virtue of that lack—suffer from 
meaninglessness. In answering the question about what kind of badness accrues to us if 
nihilism is true, the pro-realist must appeal to one of the non-moral domains of value to 
which moral value nevertheless contributes. The domain of meaning is well-suited to this 
purpose. 
What morality does, vis-à-vis the Athenian-Melian dynamic, is secure for us a 
particular normative standing in virtue of which we enjoy an authoritative claim against 
	
14 Susan Wolf, “Moral Saints.” 
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injustices. It is much better that we have this kind of standing and claim, even when we 
have no way of enforcing it. It is non-morally good to be morally worth treating well. 
Unjustified harms and oppression cause one’s life to go poorly, but one’s life is better if 
one has available an authoritative protest, even when it is ineffective. Such a protest 
secures meaning in the midst of harms; it reflects that one’s condition is intelligible as 
morally unjustified, and objectionable on these grounds. There is no adequate, non-moral 
replacement for this standing and claim if morality is bunk. At best, the death of morality 
would leave in its wake various instrumental and epistemic norms, but these are not even 
inconsistent with the aims and values that the Athenians press against the Melians. Moral 
standing differs from other kinds of standing not in degree, but in quality. Over and above 
instrumental, epistemic, and other norms, moral standing provides the strong with a 
reason not to harm the weak. 
This defense of angst about nihilism locates something that morality delivers for 
us and appeals to its irreplaceability and non-moral importance in our lives. It is worth 
noting that this view is consonant with some provocative, albeit narrower, remarks by 
Thomas Nagel regarding the importance of inviolability in any account of moral rights. 
Nagel writes, “What actually happens to us is not the only thing we care about: What may 
be done to us is also important, quite apart from whether or not it is done to us—and the 
same is true of what we may do as opposed to what we actually do” (108). Again, “not 
only is it an evil for a person to be harmed in certain ways, but for it to be permissible to 
harm the person in those ways is an additional and independent evil.” And finally, 
We can distinguish the desirability of not being tortured from the desirability of its being 
impermissible to torture us; we can distinguish the desirability of not being murdered from the 
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desirability of our murder's being impermissible; we can distinguish the desirability of not being 
coerced from the desirability of its being impermissible to coerce us. These are distinct subjects, 
and they have distinct values. To be tortured would be terrible; but to be tortured and also to be 
someone whom it was not wrong to torture would be even worse (111). 
 
Being the sort of being whom it is permissible to torture is bad, even despite the fact that 
it is in another way worse to be “killed unjustly than, say, accidentally.” Nagel’s point is 
not that permissible torture or murder are themselves worse than their impermissible 
counterparts; rather, it is “being someone it is not wrong to torture” that is worse than 
being someone it is wrong to torture—whether or not one is tortured. 
Objection: What if a realist world is such that, even if or precisely because it has 
moral value, it is, on the whole, very bad for us—for example, if it is full of little more than 
intense and constant suffering, and the best normative theory says that the suffering is 
morally unjustified? Does the non-moral goodness of mere (violated) moral status really 
outweigh or otherwise trump such a state of affairs? Surely (this objection insists), a 
realistic possibility is only better than its nihilistic counterpart if the net value in the world, 
for us, turns out positive. In contrast to a very morally bad realistic world, an otherwise 
good or even so-so nihilistic world seems better for us. If moral nihilism is true, then what 
is otherwise unjust suffering is not morally bad at all; it is nothing, morally speaking. And 
it is plausible that a set of morally bad states is worse than a set of states that are neither 
morally good nor bad. So, perhaps it is not true as a general proposition that it is better if 
realism rather than moral nihilism is true.15 
	
15 This thought seems to motivate Kahane (2016). As noted above, it is also given expression at various 
points by Parfit in Vol. 3 of On What Matters, e.g., “It is a difficult question whether and how it matters 
whether anything matters. If we believe that suffering matters greatly, we may regret this fact. We might 
try to believe that, as Nihilists claim, nothing matters, because we have no reason to care about 
anything. We might then conclude in despair that Nihilism is false, because some things, such as suffering, 
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In response to this objection, consider an implication of the view it commends. If 
an otherwise morally bad state is better if it is neither morally good nor morally bad, then 
finding out that one’s otherwise unjust suffering is morally neutral should be encouraging 
news. If a would-be morally bad state (say, the state of being betrayed) was better on 
moral nihilism, then finding out that moral nihilism is true should be a kind of appropriate 
comfort for a person experiencing betrayal. Such a discovery would not alleviate a 
person’s anger or unhappiness, but it would mean that they were not morally wronged, 
and that no particular reactions are morally justified. 
But this appeal to moral nihilism for comfort is wrongheaded. It is better not only 
that there is moral value; it is better even that morally bad things really are so. If one is 
deciding between having a set of morally neutral things (say, trips to the beach) or a 
separate set of moral evils (say, trips to the torture chamber), then, all else equal, it is 
reasonable to choose the neutral things. If the question of preferring realism over nihilism 
were analogous to such a decision, then it would be reasonable to prefer nihilism in some 
of these cases. It is from this fact, I suspect, that the objection derives its plausibility. But 
this is not the right way to think about comparing metaethical possibilities. The would-be 
goods and evils must be held fixed in the comparison: this bit of would-be mercy, this 
instance of would-be wrongful treatment, etc. We are considering not just whether we 
	
really do matter.” Again, “I don’t know whether I would be … very disappointed if I came to believe that 
nothing matters in [the] reason-involving sense. I am not glad, for example, that suffering matters. But since 
I believe that we have reasons to care about suffering, and that we have other, weaker reasons to care 




have certain goods or evils period, but what it would be like if the very things we already 
rightly believe to be good or bad (like torture) were not really so. 
In this way, contrasting moral nihilism and non-nihilism bears some similarity to 
contrasting first-order normative theories that have different evaluative upshots, with the 
aim of figuring out which would be better. When contrasting Kantianism and 
Utilitarianism, for example, it is not dialectically appropriate to radically change what the 
world is like when one imagines the truth of the rival theory. In wondering whether it 
would be better if Kantianism rather than Utilitarianism is true (as Nagel does in 
discussing the goodness of having inviolable personal rights), it is not dialectically 
appropriate to simultaneously toggle whether or not pleasure and pain states exist. 
Rather, one holds fixed the world as it otherwise is—including the existence of pleasures, 
pains, and rational capacities—and imagines the implications of Kantianism and 
Utilitarianism for this world. 
To illustrate the general view on offer with an example, not only is torturing 
innocent uncles for fun morally bad, but we rightly do not want it to be otherwise. The 
question of whether torturing for fun is good or bad is not itself an evaluatively idle 
question. It is good for uncles, and for us, that it is impermissible to torture them for fun. 
This higher order desire is itself normatively justified, in addition to the justification for 
the first-order view itself. A world in which torturing innocent uncles is morally 
permissible, let alone good—holding everything else fixed—is worse than one in which it 
is morally evil. That is to say, it is to some extent better that torturing innocent uncles is 
morally bad rather than morally good.  
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The intuition that the permissibility of torture would itself be bad is related to a 
popular normative objection to simplistic versions of divine command theory, according 
to which one ought to do whatever God happens to command. The objection says that 
such a theory allows God to make it the case that actually evil actions are good, and that 
this counts against the appeal of the theory. Returning to the Melian dialogue, the point 
here is not that the Melians should be happy that their moral claim and status are 
violated, nor should they wish that their violation was in fact permissible. Rather, the 
point is that they should prefer having a moral claim and status, given the facts that 
actually constitute the violation, to not having them. 
 Ultimately, one need not be convinced by the details either of Nagel’s view or my 
view regarding, respectively, what is important about either a deontological first-order 
theory of morality or a non-nihilistic metaethic. Whatever one thinks are the goods 
(including non-moral goods) conferred by morality, these are vindicated by any non-
nihilistic metaethical theory. In other words, take whatever goods you think are delivered 
by the best first-order moral theory. These goods are, in turn, vindicated by the true non-
nihilistic metaethic, and it is to these that we can refer in justifying an angsty aversion to 
the possibility of nihilism. Notice that in order to reject this argument, you must think that 
morality makes no net-positive non-moral contribution to our lives. If, per impossible, we 
could choose whether to live in a morally nihilistic or non-nihilistic world, and could not 
appeal to moral values in making the decision, the person who rejects the argument of 
this section must say that we have no positive reason to choose the non-nihilistic world. 
And that, I think, is very implausible. 
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§2.2 The badness of anti-realism 
To consider moral nihilism is to consider the possibility that there are none of the 
goods of morality; accordingly, these goods are dialectically available for licensing 
evaluative judgments about the possibility of moral nihilism. Moral anti-realism is trickier, 
because to consider anti-realism is to consider whether there are a great number of the 
goods of morality, but understood in an anti-realistic way.16 Speaking loosely, angst about 
moral nihilism is concern about the existence of morality, but angst about anti-realism is 
concern about the nature of morality. 
The rest of this subsection applies to anti-realist theories other than quasi-realism, 
due to special complexities arising from the pan-expressivist or minimalist semantic 
program partly constitutive of quasi-realism. In going expressivist or minimalist at every 
level of discourse about the moral, the quasi-realist makes it especially difficult to say how 
quasi-realism differs from realism in its depiction of the moral domain, which in turn 
makes it difficult to say what is at stake between the two theories. Because this issue 
arises for none of the other varieties of anti-realism, it is useful to categorize and treat 
them separately. 
So what is angst-inducing about (non-quasi) anti-realism? Why might it induce 
angst in someone if the moral badness of, say, murder is not realistically construed? Why 
might it induce angst in someone if moral facts are, say, constructions grounded in 
	
16 Note on terminology: There is an unfortunate terminological parallel between “pro-realism” and “anti-
realism.” With “anti-realism” I refer to anti-realist metaethics, not an angsty aversion to moral realism. 
Elsewhere (“Preferring Moral Anti-Realism,” ms.), I employ the somewhat unhappy label, “anti-moral 
realism”, to refer to the angsty aversion to moral realism. In correspondence Selim Berker suggests “con-
realism” as a slightly happier unhappy label. 
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collections of subjective attitudes? Or if moral truths are contingent commitments that 
human beings have endorsed over time, for evolutionarily-specified purposes? Or if moral 
facts are, fundamentally, facts about the results of idealized decision-procedures among 
fully-informed agents? 
Standard, longstanding disagreements between realists and anti-realists are 
suggestive of answers having to do with objectivity, non-contingency, and the like. I 
suspect that there is something potentially angst-inducing in the anti-realistic 
interpretation of each of these aspects of morality, but the answer that I want to pursue 
here has to do with what I take to be the radically independent character of moral 
justification if moral realism is true. Following Sharon Street, I regard some kind of mind- 
or response-dependence of moral phenomena to be constitutive of moral anti-realism. 
Here is Street: 
According to the anti-realist, if an agent has normative reason to X, then this conclusion must 
somehow follow from within her own practical point of view: if the conclusion that she has reason 
to X is not entailed from within the standpoint constituted by her own set of evaluative attitudes, 
then she does not have that reason.17 
 
As Street elaborates in a footnote, “the point of contention between realists and anti-
realists about normativity is the answer to the central question of Plato’s Euthyphro (in 
rough secular paraphrase): are things valuable ultimately because we value them (anti-
realism), or do some things possess a value that holds independently of us and our 
attitudes (realism)?”18 Street locates her own constructionist view on the anti-realist side 
of this “Euthyphronic” account of the debate. (Notice that Street’s own exclusion of quasi-
	
17 Street (2016): 295. 
18 Street (2016) fn. 9. 
JOSHUA BLANCHARD 
 17 
realism in this part of the discussion is what permits the Euthyphronic account, since 
quasi-realists emphatically deny that things possess moral value in a response-dependent 
way.) 
 Street’s exact characterization is a bit too narrow for my purposes, since it seems 
to count idealizing theories as realistic. It is also too focused on an agent’s normative 
reasons, rather than moral value and truth generally. The version of the realist/anti-realist 
distinction that will I utilize here counts our hypothetical, idealized, and collective 
responses as part of “us and our attitudes.” So, here is the modified characterization of 
anti-realist theories that I will employ in what follows: 
According to anti-realism, moral truths hold in virtue of us and our attitudes, broadly construed: if 
a putative moral truth is not grounded in our evaluative attitudes—whether actual or idealized—
then it is not a moral truth. 
 
Following this taxonomy, if moral realism is true, then it is not just the case that our moral 
reasons are external in the traditional sense of being object-given, or intrinsic to the 
situations or objects that our reasons are about or for—after all, these very claims can be 
true in virtue of facts about moral agents qua valuing beings. And it is not just the case 
that moral properties are this way—after all, versions of anti-realism may claim that 
torture is wrong because it causes unjustified pain, not because anyone thinks it is wrong. 
It is the metaphysical grounds of such truths that are at issue. On realism of the “ardent” 
sort, we may have moral reasons, and things may have moral properties, in virtue of a 
system of moral truths that is itself independent of persons and their attitudes, and is in 
some sense favored by reality itself. Various metaethical parties offering positive 
accounts of morality may agree to some version of the claim that, for example, the 
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suffering and oppression of the weak at the hands of the strong generates an object-given 
reason for us to care and do something, and that these reasons are reasons to stop 
something that is itself morally bad whether or not anyone thinks so. But there is an 
additional kind of independence involved in the true moral verdict, realistically construed: 
morality itself, the system of moral truths itself—or as Eklund says, “reality” itself—
declares in favor of the oppressed, ruling their oppression a normative impossibility, with 
no reference to human moral attitudes in the grounds of this impossibility. When we think 
rightly, we concur with this verdict that did not come from us, either literally in our 
needing to issue it, or metaphysically in our attitudes, independent or collective, being 
needed to ground it. 
Is angst on this basis intelligible? One way of beginning to see that it is at least 
intelligible is to appreciate that realistic independence is qualitatively rather than 
quantitatively different from anti-realistic independence. There is, the pro-realist should 
concede, a kind of anti-realistic independence that is a matter of degree or interpersonal 
distance, which I will call the quantitative sense of independence. Consider, for example, 
a view on which moral claims are true in virtue of their being the subject of hypothetical 
agreement among idealized agents. The pro-realist should not deny that there is a 
recognizable kind of independence involved in such an account. After all, this kind of view 
explicitly and literally distances moral truths from the actual responses of individuals. But 
notice that the view does not make moral truth at all independent of individual responses 
in what I call the qualitative sense. After all, on this kind of anti-realism, the responses of 
idealized agents are partly constitutive of the moral truth, and so the truth is still tethered 
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to responses. The same goes for other response-dependent theories. For instance, any 
view on which moral claims are true in virtue of one’s robust, consistent attitudes over 
time, would be a view on which there is independence, but it is independence of the anti-
realist kind that is explicable in terms of degrees of distance from the actual responses of 
individuals. Anti-realist moral truth is always tethered in some way to actual, individual 
responses. 
In being qualitatively different, realistic independence is not just one more step 
on the ladder up and away from the actual attitudes of individuals. From the pro-realist 
point of view, for the system of moral truths to be fully independent is for it to be 
independent of our attitudes in any sense—wholly untethered from actual, individual 
responses. This is what I meant by the “radical independence” of moral truth—an 
independence that differs qualitatively from anti-realistic independence. After all, even 
the rational agreements among idealized agents would be themselves subject to the 
strictures and demands of a realistic morality. From the realist point of view, rational 
agreement among idealized selves might always produce true judgments, but such 
success is understood as the non-trivial success of tracking, rather than constituting or 
constructing, the independent truth. 
I have made some effort to characterize the difference between realistic and anti-
realistic independence with an eye toward making intelligible why someone might be 
angsty about only having the latter, but I have not yet attempted to explain directly what 
would be so good (and irreplaceable) about realistic independence. First, a caveat: 
someone who finds moral realism of the sort described to be itself unintelligible will 
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struggle to see how there can be anything other than degreed (or tethered) independence 
from individual responses. In a way, such a person is not the target of my argument, any 
more than the person who claims not to understand the concept of God is a target of 
arguments that it is good if God exists. On the other hand, I do want to show that, given 
that someone thinks that there is such a possibility as moral realism, it is at the very least 
rationally intelligible that they would not find anti-realist independence a fitting surrogate 
for realist independence. Fitting surrogates must be relevantly similar in kind to their 
originals, and I hope this discussion shows that anti-realist independence is not such a 
surrogate for realistic independence. 
For the pro-realist, the radically independent nature of moral justification is good, 
but not merely good; it plays an existentially significant role in the meaning and 
intelligibility of life. This is because it militates against a kind of normative lonesomeness 
or moral bootstrapping, in which—in one way or another, at bottom—agents and their 
attitudes are responsible (either causally or constitutively) for providing our own moral 
vindication.19 Again, I reluctantly allow that pro-realist angst might be intelligible only 
from within the perspective of someone who “gets” what it would be like to see morality 
in a realist way, in which context radically independent moral truth and justification is 	
19 Cf. the following extended excerpt from Wright (1995: 226), who makes a related point (though one 
whose import he ultimately rejects) about external sanction: “In general … the immediate price of anti-
realism about morals is merely[!] that the gravity of moral judgement will lack an external sanction. When 
one is asked, 'Why bother to try to arrive at correct moral opinion?', the only available answer will be: 
because such an opinion informs better conduct—better, that is, from a moral point of view. The value of 
moral truth will thus be an instrumental, moral value. It is common to think that there are, by contrast, 
intrinsic, general values associated with pure discovery, understanding and knowledge of the real world. 
Properly to characterise and to understand such values seems to me to be a very difficult task. In any case, 
for the moral anti-realist, that kind of value cannot attach to moral truth. But I think it has seemed important 
that it should only because of the tendency of philosophers to suppose that there is nothing for truth to be 
that is not associated with value of that sort.” 
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available. Given a backdrop of such radical independence, there seems to be little 
difference, vis-à-vis moral bootstrapping, between the different degrees of quantitative, 
tethered independence available on anti-realism.  
Consider an elaboration of the point via an analogy to circular reasoning. Relative 
to a realist framework, increasing the degrees of tethered independence is like increasing 
the length or complexity of a bit of circular reasoning for an immensely important 
conclusion. Imagine that you take yourself to have an “independent” (now, in the sense 
of non-circular) argument for an existentially important claim (say, that human beings are 
worthy of respect). You then encounter a group of theorists (these are the analogues to 
anti-realists) who give a variety of circular arguments for the important claim. If circular 
reasoning is all these theorists think there could ever be, then, perhaps, length and 
complexity is the most you could want or hope for in terms of independence. “What more 
could you possibly want?” such theorists may ask, incredulously. But once one sees—or 
takes oneself to see—an independent, non-circular route to the existentially important 
claim, it makes sense that the circular routes, including the longest and most complex 
among them, will pale in comparison.  
It seems to me that, in the relevant respects having to do with existential concern, 
anti-realistically interpreted moral justification is to realistic justification as circular 
reasoning to an important claim is to non-circular reasoning for that claim. Crucially, the 
analogy is not supposed to establish that anti-realistic justification is somehow formally 
circular. Rather, the claim is that, contrasted with moral justification realistically 
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construed, its grounds are similarly self-referential, in a sense that includes but is broader 
than formal circularity. 
More can be said to defend the intelligibility of pro-realist angst. Although the 
considerations that follow do not depend on the analogy to circular reasoning, they are 
similar in spirit. Perhaps surprisingly, the perspective on offer here is sympathetic to (but 
not quite the same as) an argument due to the quasi-realist Simon Blackburn, who is 
hardly a friend of the sort of ardent moral realism in consideration here. Blackburn argues 
that several anti-realist views face a problem of moral relativism. For example, he offers 
the following objection to the constructivist metaethic associated with Christine 
Korsgaard, according to which each person is rationally bound to self-legislate moral 
norms in virtue of an inescapable practical identity. Korsgaard’s view, he says, fails to 
preclude “pluralities of self-legislating persons whose identities are happily bound up in 
various constraints they set themselves under, but who unfortunately find these 
constraints in entirely different places.”20 How does this relate to pro-realism? The pro-
realist may adapt Blackburn’s worry into the present discussion by saying that what would 
be bad or regrettable about Korsgaardian constructivism—even if it turned out to be 
true—is precisely that, between any two different persons or communities of persons 
who locate normative constraints “in entirely different places,” there is no radically 
independent source of authority to adjudicate the dispute, to vindicate either one side or 
none. This is reminiscent of the concern about moral bootstrapping that I expressed with 
	
20 Blackburn (1999: 219). It must be noted that Blackburn also criticizes several theses associated with 
realism on the same grounds: in particular, McDowell’s sense theory and neo-Aristotelian accounts that 
ground morality in a conception of human flourishing (218-220). 
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the analogy to circular reasoning: if everyone can appeal to “constraints they set 
themselves under”, then they are ultimately justified self-referentially, by concerns that 
others need not share. 
To illustrate the point by another route, consider yet another challenge by 
Blackburn, this time aimed squarely at the moral realist. Blackburn demands that the 
moral realist explain what more it is important to “say” about moral evils beyond the 
moral condemnation to which anti-realists are equally entitled. “What is wrong with [the 
Taliban in its relation to women] is that the men oppress the women, impoverish their 
lives, and keep them in a state of ignorance and inactivity. Why should we feel any urge 
to say more than that? Isn’t it bad enough?”21 The pro-realist should reply: the urge is not 
that there be something else that we might say, but that there be more than just “we” 
saying it. The traditional realist answer was that the Taliban is not just wrong, but 
objectively and robustly so. The angsty realist does not deny that these are appealing 
aspects of the realist picture. But the really important point is that it is not the saying of 
such a thing that matters. It is rather that there is an independent verdict issued, as it 
were, by reality itself. What is “said” remains the same. Earlier I said that true moral 
statements “concur” with an independent verdict. The point is that true moral assertions 
are repetitions, restatements of a reality already partly constituted by the truths that the 
assertions express, much like two and two make four or no sphere has corners are, 
plausibly, reiterations of radically response-independent realities. 
	
21 Blackburn (1999: 223). 
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Finally, it is worth considering a somewhat peculiar objection. The objection is 
worth considering not because it is necessarily powerful in itself, but because it helps to 
illustrate one further (and final) way of bolstering the intelligibility of pro-realist angst. 
Some readers might suspect that there is a kind of crypto-theism lurking in the 
background of the perspective here advanced, and they might want to launch a 
debunking argument against pro-realism on that basis. Isn’t pro-realist just a watered 
down version of angst about the “death of God”, who provided a kind of robust, external 
reference point for morality and meaning?  
In a way, I think that the suspicions is right, but it actually provides confirmation 
of the overall framework defended here. Think of the familiar existential desires 
associated with theism: to “have God on our side”, or not to be “alone in the universe,” 
or to achieve and to see “cosmic” justice. 22  These desires plausibly derive from 
fundamental religious attitudes for which realist value is also fitting. (Incidentally, they 
also provide additional support for David Killoren’s recent argument that robust moral 
realism is a kind of “religion.”23) Even if this connection may in turn provide grounds for a 
debunking argument against a certain style of religiously-infused moral theorizing, that is 
a matter of what is true, not what would be better—and irreplaceable.24 (It would, of 	
22 The terms in quotation marks are pulled from the ether, not any particular source. 
23 David Killoren (2016), “Robust Moral Realism: An Excellent Religion,” International Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 79: 223-237. 
24 Nietzsche is probably the canonical debunker of this sort. Anscombe (1958) is widely regarded as offering 
a debunking argument along similar lines. According to the common reading, Anscombe argues that 
because modern moral philosophy is inextricably bound up with a Christian, legalistic conception of the 
world, and modern thought is non-theistic, we moderns ought to abandon modern moral philosophy for a 
tradition continuous with pre-Christian conceptions, especially ancient virtue ethics and an attendant moral 
psychology. However, because Anscombe was a devout Catholic who philosophized as such and in fact 
doubted the prospects of virtue ethics, this almost certainly is not the correct reading. Here I agree with 
Driver (2011), who reads Anscombe as offering “a modus tollens argument intended to establish the 
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course, be disappointing for pro-realists if the very grounds of their angst could be 
employed as defeaters for realism itself!) Notice, too, that the sorts of replies that the 
angst-free may give to pro-realists are manifestly unsatisfying in their analogue religious 
form. To the pro-theist who desperately wants not to be “alone in the universe,” it is 
hardly comforting that some naturalistic construal of God—say, that God is identical to 
humanity’s highest ideals—also gives us a kind of company in the universe, in the form of 
our ideals being with us. If anything, the linkage to the religious case reinforces the 
intelligibility of angsty dissatisfaction with the falsity of realism. 
None of this is to say that moral realism is true; the point is that it is intelligible to 
regard its truth as preferable to its falsity, and that we can come to appreciate the reasons 
why someone might so prefer. Put another way, were we—per impossible—deciding in 
advance what kind of nature the moral domain is to have, we would have some good 
grounds to select from ardently realist options. There is reason to want moral justification 
and vindication to be wholly untethered from our responses. 
§2.3 The inexpressible badness of quasi-realism 
At a high level of abstraction, anti-realist theories are theories that attempt to 
accommodate our moral discourse and practice without the characteristic metaphysical 
commitments of realism, that is, without commitments to a realistic construal of moral 
facts, properties, truths, and the like. The radical independence of moral truth, 
accommodated only by realism, can therefore play a role in establishing an evaluative 
	
superiority of a religious based ethics.” See Mavrodes (1986) for a more explicit modus tollens in favor of a 
theistic ethic on the grounds of the necessity of theism for morality, in response to Mackie’s “queerness” 
argument. 
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difference between realism and anti-realism partly because it amounts to a kind of 
independence that the standard-issue anti-realist explicitly denies, despite allowing for 
their own kind of degreed independence. 
Things are not so easy with the quasi-realist, and this section seeks to explain (or 
mostly to kvetch about) why. Like the standard-issue anti-realist, the quasi-realist 
attempts to accommodate our moral discourse and practice without the characteristic 
metaphysical commitments of realism. Interestingly, this very fact suggests that whatever 
goes for pro-realism vis-à-vis its metaphysical differences with standard-issue anti-
realism should in turn apply to its differences with quasi-realism. But there is one crucial 
problem: the quasi-realist is an accommodationist in the extreme, seeking to, as a 
common boast goes, say anything that the realist can say. Anything? Yes—including 
statements that emit the strong aroma of realism, for example, “It is a response-
independent, objective fact that torturing for its own sake is wrong.” Notoriously, if this 
project succeeds, then realists are precluded from identifying anything in the first-, 
second, or nth-order moral domain that distinguishes them from quasi-realists. And if we 
cannot distinguish realism from quasi-realism descriptively, it seems that we cannot say 
what distinguishes it evaluatively.25  If there is no way to say how realism would be 
different from quasi-realism, then there is certainly no way to say why it would be 
	
25 With respect to quasi-realists themselves, things did not always look so bleak. In 1973 Blackburn defined 
“moral realism” as the view that “the truth of a moral utterances … consist[s] in their correspondence with 
some fact or state of affairs”, and he even declared it “false” (102). But by the 1980s, the hopes for 
distinguishing realism from its rivals went dramatically downhill with the increasing popularity of the 
minimalist theory of truth. See, for example, the struggles of Wright (1988). 
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better.26 Due to quasi-realism’s reliance on the minimalist notion of truth, according to 
which predicating truth of a proposition adds nothing substantial to the assertion of the 
proposition itself, the problem has become known as “the problem of creeping 
minimalism.” 27  The difficulty, in brief, is that if the anti-realist adopts a minimalist 
conception of truth that avoids identifying truth with what Crispin Wright calls “a property 
of intrinsic metaphysical gravitas,” 28  then the sorts of truth-claims that otherwise 
distinguish the realist from the anti-realist can no longer do their work.29 
While there is not room here to delve too far into this well-trodden territory, I will 
raise a suspicion about the state of the dialectic between quasi-realism and realism. This 
will in turn shed light on what pro-realists should say about quasi-realism—or more to the 
point, what they should say about not being able to say much at all. 
The suspicious fact is that what makes quasi-realism and realism allegedly 
metaphysically indistinguishable is what you might take to be a purely semantic 
	
26 Combined with the point just made about metaphysical differences with anti-realism, we are left in a 
peculiar position. Given that quasi-realism adds nothing metaphysically to anti-realism, and that realism is 
certainly metaphysically different from anti-realism, it seems that there must be some difference—we 
just cannot say what it is. 
27 See Dreier (2004) for the classic contemporary statement of the problem. Dreier laments that “It’s not as 
if one side had better be able to come up with something clever to say about how to distinguish realism 
from [quasi-realism] or else the other side wins. It’s rather that those of us who feel confident that there is 
some difference between the two meta-ethical camps should be concerned that we don’t know how to say 
what that difference is” (31). My argument in this section says that we have reason to be unconcerned that 
we don’t know how to say what the difference is. 
28 Wright (1995: 213). 
29 Many metaethicists take the problem of creeping minimalism to be a problem for quasi-realists rather 
than realists. The thought is that, once quasi-realists adopt the minimalist program, it is they who have no 
way of explaining why they are not full-fledged realists. If that is right, then there is little sense in a pro-
realist being worried about the truth of quasi-realism, since quasi-realism is just disguised realism. What 
follows in the main text can be read as pursuing the other horn of an implicit dilemma—the possibility 
that the problem of creeping minimalism is really a problem for realists, that it is they who have no way of 
explaining what they add to quasi-realism. But if one thinks that it is quasi-realists who chiefly face this 
burden, then so much the better for pro-realism. 
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maneuver—namely, the adoption of expressivism at every level of ethical and meta-
ethical discourse.30 Such a maneuver only works (for the purposes of accommodating 
everything that realism accommodates) if reality is always exhausted by what we are able 
to say. To illustrate, imagine two figures: a conventional moral realist and an anti-realist 
who is expressivist about only first-order moral discourse. (The early emotivists can, 
without too much interpretative harm, be thought of in this way.) Both the conventional 
realist and first-order expressivist may agree in asserting any number of first-order moral 
sentences, for example, “Torturing for its own sake is morally wrong.” However, they can 
also agree that the underlying metaphysic for each theory is different. Accordingly, they 
may disagree about various meta-moral, metaphysical sentences, for example, “The fact 
that torturing innocent uncles for fun is wrong is an objective, mind-independent fact in 
all possible worlds.” They can then point to the object of the disagreement—the nature 
of moral facts—and ask whether it would be better for such facts to be realistic or anti-
realistic. Notice, too, that the first-order expressivist can, consistently with his own 
semantics, acknowledge that the kind of realistic independence highlighted in the 
previous section is not countenanced in his theory. He may even lament that fact. 
But suppose that the first-order expressivist has an unusual conversion: he comes 
to endorse expressivism at all levels of discourse about the moral: he becomes a pan-
expressivist. What becomes of the previous disagreement over the sentence, “[T]he fact 
that torturing innocent uncles for fun is wrong is an objective, mind-independent fact in 
	
30 Here I am departing somewhat from the literature in identifying what we might call a problem of 
creeping expressivism rather than creeping minimalism. 
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all possible worlds”? Merely by changing his semantics (but in a way that somehow 
changes nothing in his metaphysics), the pan-expressivist now putatively agrees with the 
realist. Moreover, he can taunt the realist as follows: “You realists claim to be endorsing 
something above and beyond what we anti-realists endorse—but what?” This 
challenge—“but what?”—is unanswerable in the dialectical context, since there is no 
expressible “what” for which the pan-expressivist cannot give an expressivist reading. And 
so he may also taunt the pro-moral realist, “You can’t tell me what the difference is 
between our realism and quasi-realism, so why are you so angsty about it?” 
What has the pan-expressivist done, dialectically speaking? I submit that he has 
simply taken away the realist’s license to make distinctly realistic assertions—but only in 
the context of confronting pan-expressivism. Unfortunately, if the realist cannot make 
such assertions, then the pro-realist cannot go on to say, in light of some expressible 
difference, that it is better if realism is true, even if it is! Notice, crucially, that there is no 
good reason to think that the limits on what can be appropriately said are likewise limits 
on what the world is like. Even so, the realist is pushed into a narrow, involuntary 
mysticism. By “mysticism” I just mean any position that says there are truths that we are 
unable to express.31 Such mysticism is narrow, because the pro-realist is coerced into it 
only when engaging a pan-expressivist. It is involuntary, because there are no 
commitments or independent considerations on the side of the pro-realist that force or 
even so much as motivate it. For example, there need be no explicit thought, 
	
31 This is a much thinner notion of mysticism than one finds in, for example, the canonical discussion by 
William James, Varieties, 281-283. 
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characteristic of independently motivated mysticism, that moral reality does outstrip our 
expressive capacities, though such a view may be very well-motivated in general.32 For 
these reasons, in the dialectical context of contrasting realism with quasi-realism, the pro-
realist is coerced into going mystical about both the difference between realism and 
quasi-realism, and therefore any evaluative judgment about that difference. 
While the fate of the pro-realist at the hands of the quasi-realist is a philosophical 
injustice, the injustice is clear enough that one need not despair. To show that the pro-
realist’s predicament lacks any metaphysical interest whatsoever, I will consider (and 
close with) three otherwise distant topics, where there are debates (either actual or 
merely possible) with surprisingly similar structural aspects: Berkeleyan immaterialism, 
theism, and the metaphysics of consciousness. In each of these debates, the pro-realist 
can find innocent companions in coerced mysticism, each of them falling victim to either 
a pan-expressivist gambit or something similar to it. Yet, in each case, it seems reasonable 
for the pro-realist’s counterpart to remain angsty, despite being robbed of the expressive 
power to say why. On this basis, the pro-realist may remain confident that it is better if 
realism rather than quasi-realism is true, even if the realist lacks the dialectical license to 
say it to the quasi-realist’s face. 
§2.3.1 Berkeleyan immaterialism 
According to Berkeleyan immaterialism (henceforth just immaterialism), mental 
substance is the only kind of substance. A common misconception has it that there are 
	
32 For examples of mysticism that is independently motivated in this sense, see Thomas Hofweber (ms), 
“Are there Completely Ineffable Aspects of Reality?”; Fodor’s (1983:120ff.) discussion of “epistemic 
bounded[ness]”; McGinn (1989); and Chomsky (1988: 151-152). 
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no external or physical objects of any kind according to this view, indeed no physical world 
at all. But immaterialism really just says something about such objects and the world—at 
the fundamental level, these are mentally constituted, and there is no need for an 
additional technical notion of physical substance. There are physical objects, but not in 
the kind of deep metaphysical sense posited by materialism. The ordinary category 
“physical” is just one of many kinds of ultimately mental substance.33 
Immaterialism provides an illuminating surrogate for sophisticated quasi-realist 
positions in metaethics. What Berkeley accommodates vis-à-vis materialism and dualism, 
quasi-realists accommodate vis-à-vis moral realism. Berkeley can say anything that the 
materialist or dualist can say. Sentences like, “There are minds and bodies,” “Some 
objects are physical,” “There are objects other than minds,” etc., are welcomed by the 
immaterialist. Yet these are just the sentences that one might have hoped would 
distinguish theses like substance dualism from its rivals! Crucially, Berkeley himself denies 
appeals to the materialist’s technical notion of material substance; indeed, he denies that 
the notion is even intelligible. Likewise, the moral quasi-realist may deny the realist’s 
technical notion of realistically construed, robust moral properties; indeed, quasi-realists 
commonly deny that such notions are even intelligible. But, with a gambit of the pan-
expressivist sort, there would be no need for the immaterialist to even deny talk of 
“material substance,” provided it can be given an immaterialist reading. 
	
33 “[C]ollections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things – which as they are 
pleasing or disagreeable excite the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth” (Berkeley, Of the 
Principles of Human Knowledge, 1.1, emphasis mine). 
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That we are all mental substances ultimately existing as ideas in the mind of God 
is not an evaluatively idle idea; it is something one might appropriately want not to be 
true. Unfortunately, it is impossible to explain what is so bad about this prospect to an 
immaterialist who can agree with any sentences uttered by the materialist or dualist. Yet, 
who thinks that there really is no difference—both descriptively and evaluatively—
between the truth of materialism and immaterialism? Those of us who are either 
uncommitted to either view, or committed immaterialists with a semantics that can 
express materialism, or committed materialists, can express perfectly well what is lacking 
on immaterialism: the material world. Yet, we are simply robbed of the dialectical license 
to offer such a sentence in the context of arguing with an immaterialist who offers some 
kind of pan-immaterialist semantic program. 
§2.3.2 Theism 
Consider a much more familiar source of angst: God. Worries about God are more 
likely to induce philosophical angst than immaterialism. This is not a coincidence: while 
the alleged badness of naturalistic religion may bear formal analogies to the alleged 
badness of immaterialism, religion often plays a central and existentially important a role 
in human life more akin to moral value.34 
Although debates between traditional theists and atheists are most familiar to 
philosophers and non-philosophers alike, there is also a dispute between supernaturalist 
religion (henceforth, supernaturalism) and naturalist religion (henceforth, naturalism). 
Naturalists deny supernaturalist metaphysics, but seek to provide a positive account of 
	
34 Much of this, I suspect, has to do with what I say regarding “crypto-theism” above. 
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religious discourse and practice.35 Provided that something natural can play the role of 
the supernaturalist God, the naturalist may give naturalistic readings of various kinds of 
religious propositions—for example, that God exists or that God loves us. But even if the 
naturalist succeeds at this project of accommodating first-order religious discourse and 
practice, it is manifest both that naturalists and supernaturalists differ at the level of 
metaphysics, and that this has significant evaluative upshot. As long as the naturalist 
remains a second-order descriptivist, the supernaturalist and naturalist can agree that 
their metaphysics at the first-order level are different. 
But the naturalist may decide to play dirty. If he adopts a religious semantics in 
which all first-, second-, and nth-order religious discourse can come out true even without 
the truth of traditional theism, then the supernaturalist is robbed of his dialectical license 
to offer any first-, second-, or nth-order religious sentences that would otherwise 
distinguish the two theorists’ metaphysics. 
That there is no God in the traditional sense is not just an evaluatively indifferent 
idea; it is something one might intelligibly want not to be true. But it is impossible to 
appropriately explain what is so bad about this prospect to a naturalist who can agree 
with any sentences uttered by the supernaturalist. Yet, who thinks that there really is no 
difference—both descriptively and evaluatively—between the truth of supernaturalism 
and naturalism? Those of us who are either uncommitted to either view, or committed 
naturalists with a semantics that can express supernaturalism, or committed 
supernaturalists, can express perfectly well what is lacking on naturalism: God. Yet, we 
	
35 See especially Johnston (2009) and Dworkin (2013). 
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are simply robbed of the dialectical license to offer such a sentence in the context of 
arguing with a naturalist who offers some kind of pan-naturalist semantic program. 
§2.3.3 Consciousness 
Finally, consider a slightly less familiar source of angst from a still-familiar topic: 
consciousness. Consciousness does induce philosophical angst, though perhaps not as 
much as naturalism or anti-realism. But it does, in many people’s conceptual schemes, 
play an important role. For example, according to many philosophers, consciousness 
marks much of what is most valuable in the universe. A world of metaphysical zombies 
would be a much worse world than ours, at least with respect to the value contributed by 
consciousness itself. 
Imagine a philosopher named “David.” David believes that, in addition to physical 
stuff in the world, there is mental stuff, in particular, there is consciousness. Moreover, 
David thinks that, even if we cannot quite say what consciousness is in non-mental terms, 
we all (provided we are conscious) more or less have access to the fact of its existence. 
David disagrees with Phillip, who believes that there is no such thing as 
consciousness. Not only that, but they disagree over what they agree is a single 
proposition: that there is consciousness. It is dialectically appropriate for David to say to 
Phillip, “My view is different from yours, because my view posits consciousness.” This 
expressible descriptive difference allows them to maintain an evaluative dispute about 
whether it is better or worse for there to be consciousness in the world. Hence it is also 
dialectically appropriate for David to say to Phillip, “It would be better if my view were 
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true, because only my view accommodates the irreplaceable, important good that is 
consciousness.” 
But now Phillip calls over his cousin, Daniel. Helpfully for our purposes, Daniel 
adopts a semantics in which all first-, second-, and nth-order discourse about the mental 
can come out true even without the existence of consciousness in David’s sense. Hence, 
David is robbed of his dialectical license to offer any first-, second-, or nth-order sentences 
that would otherwise distinguish his metaphysics from Daniel’s. David can, of course, turn 
to Phillip and rightly say, “You and I both know that Daniel doesn’t really believe in 
consciousness,” but such a sentence cannot appropriately be offered to Daniel himself. 
What the above three examples—material objects, God, and consciousness—–
show is that it is possible to adopt a semantic or related program that takes away an 
interlocutor’s dialectical license to appropriately offer any first-, second-, … or nth-order 
sentences in the relevant domain in order to distinguish the metaphysics of the two 
theories in question. Consequently, it becomes impossible to give a descriptive account 
of what makes one angsty in the domain. After all, one cannot intelligibly evaluate what 
one cannot identify in the first place. Hence, the pro-realist is not the only sort of person 
coerced into what I have called involuntary mysticism. There are companions in 
metaphysics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, and elsewhere. 
What should we conclude from this, vis-à-vis the truth of pro-realism? Although 
the pro-realist is prevented from appropriately defending the claim that it would be worse 
if quasi-realism were true in the narrow dialectical context of engaging an actual quasi-
realist, the assertion may still be maintained in every other context. There are no good 
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reasons for thinking that what goes for realism versus anti-realism generally, does not 
also go for realism versus quasi-realism. There are only good reasons to think that the 
pro-realist lacks the dialectical license to say so to the quasi-realist. As we have seen, the 
pan-expressivist gambit of the quasi-realist makes no metaphysical difference to the 
distinction between realism and non-quasi anti-realism; hence it must also make no 
evaluative difference. So, just as the realistic independence of moral vindication justifies 
the hope that realism rather than anti-realism is true, so it justifies the hope that realism 
rather than quasi-realism is true. This much, at least, we can affirm when the quasi-realist 
is not in the room. 
§3 Conclusion 
 In this paper, my ultimate goal has been to commend the research program of 
angsty metaethics and the exploration of metaethical value judgments. To this end, I 
defended the claim that it is much better that moral realism rather than any of its rivals 
is true.36 
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